

## DANIEL R. VINCENT – CURRICULUM VITAE

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**ADDRESS:** Department of Economics  
University of Maryland  
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**CITIZENSHIP:** Canadian/U.S. Dual Citizenship

### EDUCATION:

#### Degrees:

Degree	Field	Institution	Year
Ph.D.	Economics	Princeton University	1987
B.A.	Philosophy, Politics, Economics	Merton College, Oxford University	1983
B.A.	History	University of Toronto	1981

#### Dissertation:

*Strategic Interaction in Dynamic Trading Games: Three Essays in Non-cooperative Game Theory*

Advisor: Hugo Sonnenschein

### RESEARCH AREAS:

Microeconomic Theory - Theory of Auctions, Empirical Applications of Auction Theory, Bargaining, Procurement, Industrial Organization, Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design.  
Industrial Organization – Two-sided markets, vertical control, bundling.  
International Trade.  
Mathematical Economics.

### ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

2003-- Professor, Department of Economics, University of Maryland.  
2005 Visiting Professor, Carey School of Business, Arizona State University.  
1999 Visiting Scholar, U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.  
1998-2003 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Maryland.

- 1995-1998 Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario.  
 1987-1995 Assistant Professor, J.L. Kellogg Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.  
 1992-1993 Visiting Assistant Professor, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, California Institute of Technology.

## **PUBLICATIONS:**

### **Journal Articles and Book Chapters:**

- Vincent, Daniel R. and Alejandro Manelli. "Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation in the Independent Private Values Model", *Econometrica*, **78** 6, (2010), 1905-1939.
- Schwartz, Marius, and Daniel R. Vincent. "Quantity 'forcing' and exclusion: Bundled discounts and non linear pricing ", for *Issues in Competition Law and Policy*, American Bar Association, (2008).
- Vincent, Daniel R. and Alejandro Manelli. "Multi-Dimensional Mechanism Design: Revenue Maximization and the Multiple Good Monopoly", *Journal of Economic Theory*, 137, 1(2007): 153-185.
- Schwartz, Marius, and Daniel R. Vincent. "The No Surcharge Rule and Buyer Rebates: Vertical Control by a Payments Networks", *Review of Network Economics*, 5,1 (2006).
- Vincent, Daniel R. and Alejandro Manelli. "Bundling as an Optimal Selling Mechanism for a Multiple-Good Monopolist", *Journal of Economic Theory*, 127, 1 (2006): 1-35.
- Vincent, Daniel R., and Ignatius Horstmann. "A Model of Multi-Nationals", in *Governance, Multinationals and Growth*, edited by Lorraine Eden and Wendy Dobson, Edward Elgar, (2005).
- Alejandro Manelli and Daniel R. Vincent. "Duality in Procurement Design", *Journal of Mathematical Economics*, 40, 3 (2003): 411-428.
- McAfee, R. Preston., Daniel C. Quan., and Daniel R. Vincent. "How to Set Minimum Acceptable Bids with an Application to Real Estate Auctions." *Journal of Industrial Economics* 50 (2002): 391-416.
- Vincent, Daniel R., and Motty Perry. "Optimal Timing of Procurement Decisions and Patent Allocations." *International Economic Review* 43 (2002): 1035-1052.
- McAfee, R. Preston., Wendy Takacs., and Daniel R. Vincent. "Tarrifying Auctions." *Rand Journal*, 30, 1(1999): 158-179.
- Vincent, Daniel R. "Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships," *International Economic Review* 39, 2 (1998): 275-293

McAfee, R. Preston., and Daniel R. Vincent. "Sequentially Optimal Auctions." *Games and Economic Behavior* 18, 2 (1997): 246-276.

Manelli, Alejandro M., and Daniel R. Vincent. "Optimal Procurement Mechanisms." *Econometrica* 63, 3 (1995): 591-620.

Vincent, Daniel R. "Bidding off the Wall: Why Reserve Prices May Be Kept Secret." *Journal of Economic Theory* 65, 2 (1995): 575-584.

McAfee, R. Preston., Daniel Vincent., Michael A. Williams., and Melanie Williams Havens., "Collusive Bidding in Hostile Takeovers." *Journal of Economics and Management Strategy* 2, 4 (1993): 449-482.

McAfee, R. Preston., and Daniel Vincent. "The Declining Price Anomaly." *Journal of Economic Theory* 60, 1 (1993): 191-212.

McAfee, R. Preston., and Daniel Vincent, "Updating the Reserve Price in Common-Value Auctions." *American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings* 82, 2 (1992): 512-518.

Vincent, Daniel R. "Modelling Competitive Behavior." *Rand Journal of Economics* 23, 4 (1992): 590-599.

Fershtman, Chaim., Zvi Safra., and Daniel Vincent. "Delayed Agreements and Unexpected Utility." *Games and Economic Behavior* 3, 4 (1991): 423-437.

Vincent, Daniel R. "Dynamic Auctions." *Review of Economic Studies*, 57, 1 (1990): 49-61.

Vincent, Daniel R. "Bargaining With Common Values." *Journal of Economic Theory* 48, 1 (1989): 47-62.

#### **Contributed Papers:**

Segal, U. and Daniel R. Vincent. "Punishment Schedules for Capital Flight", *The World Economy*, Vol. 21, 5. (1998): 629-638.

#### **Book Review in Refereed Journal:**

Vincent, Daniel R. "Review of *A Theory of Moves* by Steven J. Brams." In *Journal of Economic Literature* 33, 2 (1995): 823-824.

#### **Non-Refereed Published Commentaries:**

Vincent, Daniel R. and Marius Schwartz. "The National Television Ownership Cap and Localism." paper submitted with Comments of NAB and NASA to FCC in *2002 Biennial Regulatory Review – Review of the Commission’s Broadcast Ownership Rules and Other Rules*, FCC 02-249, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (rel. Sept. 23, 2002), January 2, 2003.

Vincent, Daniel R. "Revenue Equivalence, the Winner's Curse and Aftermarket Sales in Auctions." *Proceedings of Spectrum 20/20*. The Radio Advisory Bureau, Ottawa, November 1996.

Vincent, Daniel R. "Comments on 'Review of the Comparative Selection and Radio Licensing Process--Findings'." [Prepared as an Appendix to: Mobility Canada, "Policy Discussion Respecting: 'Review of the Comparative Selection and Radio Licensing Process--Findings'."] June 30, 1996.

Vincent, Daniel R. "Industry Canada is Taking Itself to the Cleaners." *The Globe and Mail*, December 7, 1995.

## **UNPUBLISHED WORK:**

### **Manuscripts at Submission Stage:**

### **Working Papers and Mimeos:**

Manelli, Alejandro., and Daniel R. Vincent. "Mecanismos Optimos de Adjudicacion de Contratos Publicos: La adquisicion de material de telecomunicaciones y la venta del espectro de frecuencias de radio." FEDEA Madrid, DT 95-19 (October 1995).

Kamien, Morton., and Daniel R. Vincent. "Price Regulation and Quality of Service." CMSEMS DP. No. 920 (February 1991).

Vincent, Daniel R. "Principals and Partners: The Structure of Syndicates." CMSEMS DP No. 909 (January 1991).

### **Work in Progress:**

Vincent, Daniel R., and R. Preston McAfee. "A Simple Test of the IPV-CV Hypothesis."

Vincent, Daniel R. and Alejandro Manelli. "Information Revelation Policies for Sellers at Auction."

## **UNIVERSITY ADMINISTRATIVE DUTIES:**

Chair, Senior Recruiting Committee, University of Maryland, 2008-2010.

BSOS Dean Search Committee, University of Maryland, 2009.

Departmental Salary Committee, University of Maryland, 2003-2006.

Departmental Chair Search Committee, University of Maryland, 2005.

Co-chair, Departmental Journal Rankings Committee, University of Maryland, 2003-2004.

Departmental Executive Committee, University of Maryland, 2000-2002.

Junior Recruiting Committee, University of Maryland, 1999-2003, 2005-2007.

Ad Hoc Committee on Senior Recruitment, University of Maryland, 1998-99.

**P.H.D. THESIS COMMITTEES:**

Gail Cohen, Managerial Economics and Decision Sciences, J. L. Kellogg Graduate School, Northwestern University, 1992.

Topic: Essays in Industrial Organization.

Currently at Federal Energy Commission, Washington, DC.

Brian Rivard, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, 1996.

Topic: An Imperfect Competition Suite.

First position: Competition Bureau, Industry Canada, Ottawa.

Benoit Julien, Department of Economics, University of Western Ontario, 1996.

Topic: Essays on Auctions and Contracts

Currently on Faculty at Department of Economics, University of Miami.

Soamiely Andriamananjara, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 1999.

Topic: Regionalism and Its Effects on Multilateralism

First position: International Trade Commission.

Jesse Schwartz, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 1999.

Topic: Demand Reduction in Multiple Unit Ascending Auctions

First position: Department of Economics, Vanderbilt University.

Gary Anderson, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 1999.

Topic: Multinational Corporations and Developing Countries

First position: ITAM, Mexico City, Mexico.

Gwen Alexander, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2000.

Topic: Essays in MicroFinance.

Jeff Lien, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2000.

Topic: The Strategic Use of Forward Contracts: Applications to Power Markets.

Currently at the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.

Haiwen Zhou, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2002.

Topic: Three Essays on Industrial Organization.

Currently at Old Dominion University.

Nisvan Erkal, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2002.

Topic: Essays on Innovation, Disclosure and Product Choice

Currently at the University of Melbourne.

Roberto Munoz, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2003.

Topic: Essays on "The Role of Private Benefits on the Efficient Transfer of Control in a Firm and Equilibrium Selection in a Link Formation Game."

Ashish Narain, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2003.

Topic: Capital Mobility, Trade Liberalization and Unions.

Kyeong-Hoon Kang, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2003.

Topic: Market Structure and Competition in Systems Markets.

Currently at Korea Institute of Finance.

Patricia Tovar Rodriguez, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2005.

Topic: The effects of loss aversion on trade policy. Currently at Brandeis University.

Min Ouyang, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2005.

Topic: Resource reallocation, productivity dynamics, and business cycles.

Currently at U.C.-Irvine .

Heisnam Singh, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2007.

Topic: Essays on price competition and firm strategies in oligopolies. Currently at PwC.

Natalia Perez, Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2007.

Topic: Essays on the Impact of Social Interactions on

Economic Outcomes. Currently at Ernst and Young.

Thayer Morrill. Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2008.

Topic: Three essays on market design. Currently at North Carolina State University.

Grozeva, Vesela. Department of Economics, University of Maryland, 2010.

Topic: Dynamic Competition with Customer Recognition and Switching Costs. Currently at Ernst and Young.

## **CONSULTING:**

Principal, Market Design Incorporated (MDI), Stanford, CA.

Consultant for the U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division – Various antitrust matters – 2000-2010.

Consultant for a party concerning the Google-Yahoo Alliance, 2008.

Consultant for Videotron, Industry Canada AWS Auctions, 2008.

Consultant for Cox, U.S. 700MHZ Spectrum Auctions, 2008.

Consultant on Canadian Spectrum Issues, Lemay-Yates Associates, 2007.

Consultant for Time-Warner, U.S. AWS Spectrum Auctions, 2006.

Consultant for Exelon, Illinois Electric Load Auction, 2006.

Consultant for an auction client (through NERA), 2002, 2003.

Consultant for the National Football League, (with Marius Schwartz), 2003.

Consultant for the National Association of Station Affiliates, (with Marius Schwartz), 2002-2003.

Consultant for Industry Canada. Review of auction rules for PCS auctions. (Joint with MDI/CRA),

June, 2000.

Consultant for a participant in the Alberta, PPA auctions, Spring, 2000--

Consultant for OFCOM, Switzerland. Design of auction for UMTS 3G services. Spring, 2000 --

Consultant for a participant in U.K. UMTS 3G spectrum auctions, January-March, 2000.

Consultant for a participant in Industry Canada, 24-38MHZ spectrum auctions, November, 1999.

Consultant for the Federal Communications Commission. Modification of Auction Rules for Combinatorial Bidding. (Joint with MDI/CRA). 1997-1998.

Consultant for the Federal Communications Commission--Assessment of U.S. Spectrum Auctions and Auctions Adviser--1997.

Consultant for Industry Canada, "Assessment of the Market Value of Cellular Telephones, Personal Communication Services and Enhanced Specialized Mobile Radio License Fees," 1996-1997.

Consultant for TELUS on Industry Canada's proposal for a revision of the radio frequency licensing process.

Consultant for Ameritech, Chicago, IL (D and E Block BTA Auctions, 1995.)

Consultant on 1994 FCC Spectrum Auction Design for American Personal Communications, Washington, D.C. (Auction design phase).

Consultant on Tariff-Quota Equivalents and Auction Data for the World Bank, 1992 to 1994.

Consultant on Procurement Methods for the Bank of Spain, 1994.

### **PROFESSIONAL SERVICE:**

Associate Editor, *Journal of Economic Theory*, Summer 1996- Spring, 2003.

Member, Editorial Board, *American Economic Review*, 2000 - 2006.

Invited Lecturer, World Bank, Transparency in Infrastructure, March, November, 2002, January, 2004.

Invited Lecturer, Harvard Institute for International Development, Privatization Project, July, 2000.

### **REFEREEING:**

#### **(i) Journals**

*American Economic Review*  
*Econometrica*  
*Economic Design*  
*Economic Inquiry*  
*Economic Theory*  
*Games and Economic Behavior*

*Journal of Economic Theory*  
*Journal of Industrial Economics*  
*Journal of Law, Economics and Organization*  
*Journal of Public Economics*  
*Quarterly Journal of Economics*

*Journal of Economics and Management Strategy*  
*Journal of Economics and Statistics*

*Rand Journal of Economics*  
*Review of Economic Studies*

**(ii) Research Organizations**

National Science Foundation  
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada

**RESEARCH GRANTS:**

2003-2006 National Science Foundation Grant # 0241173, "Revenue Maximization in Multi-Object Auctions".

2001-2003 National Science Foundation Grant # 0095729, "Information Revelation Policies for Sellers at Auction"

1996-1999 "Auction Theory and Empirical Applications" \$50,000 SSHRC