A Multilingual Perspective on Translanguaging

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Translanguaging is a new term in bilingual education; it supports a heteroglossic language ideology, which views bilingualism as valuable in its own right. Some translanguaging scholars have questioned the existence of discrete languages, further concluding that multilingualism does not exist. I argue that the political use of language names can and should be distinguished from the social and structural idealizations used to study linguistic diversity, favoring what I call an integrated multilingual model of individual bilingualism, contrasted with the unitary model and dual competence model. I further distinguish grammars from linguistic repertoires, arguing that bilinguals, like monolinguals, have a single linguistic repertoire but a richly diverse mental grammar. I call the viewpoint developed here a multilingual perspective on translanguaging.

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Translanguaging has emerged as a new term within bilingual education and has given voice to a heteroglossic language ideology (Bailey, 2007; Bakhtin, 1975; García, 2009) that values bilingualism as a sustainable community resource in its own right rather than a merely tolerated transition to majority language monolingualism (a monoglossic ideology). However, some translanguaging scholars have recently called the existence of discrete languages into question, arguing that multilingualism itself does not exist (compare Blommaert, 2010; Davidson, 1986; Harris, 1981; Heller, 2007; Heller & Duchêne, 2007; Kemp, 2009; Kravchenko, 2007; Makoni & Makoni, 2010; Makoni & Pennycook, 2007; Pennycook, 2006). For instance,
Makoni and Pennycook (2007) argue that “languages do not exist as real entities in the world and neither do they emerge from or represent real environments; they are, by contrast, the inventions of social, cultural and political movements” (p. 2). These conclusions are motivated by a consideration of the colonial history of language names and their boundaries viewed through a postmodernist lens on language planning and policy:

A postmodern (or postcolonial) approach to language policy... suggests we no longer need to maintain the pernicious myth that languages exist. Thus we can start to develop an anti-foundationalist view of language as an emergent property of social interaction and not of prior system tied to ethnicity, territory, birth, or nation. The very notion that... we can decide to have one, two, three, five or eleven languages in a language policy becomes highly questionable... Yet the questions I have raised here suggest that languages cannot in fact be planned... since there is ultimately no good reason to continue to posit their existence. (Pennycook, 2006, p. 67)

Pennycook (2006) sees languages as “not so much ontological systems” but rather as “products of language use sedimented through acts of identity” (p. 71). Makoni and Pennycook (2007) note that if discrete languages do not exist, neither do “many of the treasured icons of liberal-linguistic thought... such as language rights, mother tongues, multilingualism or code-switching” (p. 22). Building on this basic idea, García and colleagues (García & Otheguy, 2014; Otheguy, García, & Reid, 2015) offer a clarification of translanguaging theory in which they similarly reject (individual) multilingualism, insisting that a bilingual individual has an internally undifferentiated, unitary linguistic system uniquely configured as an *idiolect*, or individual language. Consistent with this point of view, codeswitching must also be rejected for García and colleagues as it “constitutes a theoretical endorsement of the idea that what the bilingual manipulates, however masterfully, are two separate linguistic systems” (Otheguy et al., 2015, p. 282).

**Codeswitching** is a speech style in which bilinguals alternate languages between or within sentences. For instance, Spanish-English bilinguals might say, *This morning mi hermano y yo fuimos a comprar some milk* (“This morning my brother and I went to buy some milk”), where the sentence begins in English, switches to Spanish, and then moves back to English again. The practice is very common throughout the world, especially among members of bilingual families and communities.

The consequences of denying the existence of multilingualism and therefore of codeswitching are far reaching. If codeswitching does not exist, then neither does the empirical basis for the repudiation of a deficit perspective on language mixing, a critically important and frequently cited (e.g., Cook, 2001; Durán & Palmer, 2013; Fuller, 2009; García, 2009; García, Flores, & Woodley, 2015; Gort, 2012; Grosjean, 1982, 2010; Martínez, 2010;
Valdes-Fallis, 1978) body of basic scientific research. In other words, we cannot both rely on codeswitching scholarship to support a positive view of bilingualism and simultaneously deny that multilingualism and codeswitching exist, and by choosing to do the latter over the former, we lose the empirical case against a deficit perspective on bilingualism and are left only with an ideological one.

In the present review, I offer a critical assessment of the theory of bilingualism proposed by García and colleagues (García & Otheguy, 2014; Otheguy et al., 2015), showing that it is at odds with what we know empirically and theoretically about bilingualism and that it seriously weakens the associated conceptual framework, which I will call holistic bilingualism, following Grosjean (1982). I suggest an alternative point of view, called a multilingual perspective on translanguaging, which acknowledges the existence of discrete languages and multilingualism (in a sense I will clarify) along with other “treasured icons” of the field, including language rights, mother tongues, and codeswitching. My intention is not to disparage translanguaging or discourage researchers from using it as a lens; rather, I offer a clarification of the linguistic theory underlying translanguaging, hoping to reconcile educational and linguistic research.

As a field of research, codeswitching emerged in the middle of the last century, energized by the pioneering work of Weinreich (1953), Haugen (1956), and Mackey (1967), just as social and educational policy began to keenly focus on marginalized and economically disadvantaged groups in the context of the Civil Rights Movement and Johnson’s War on Poverty (Benson, 2001; Riegelhaupt, 2000). Language and its relation to educational achievement dominated conversations about African American students and similarly moved to the forefront of conversations about achievement of Latino students in the wake of the Mexican American student walkouts in East Los Angeles in 1968 (Crawford, 2004). Scholars concerned with academic underachievement among bilingual students began to address important questions about the language these children bring to school and how language may relate to our understanding of school failure. Much as Labov (1965, 1970), Wolfram (1969), Fasold (1972), and others had shown through painstaking analysis that stigmatized language varieties spoken by African Americans were just as rich and complex as the language of the privileged classes, codeswitching researchers undertook to show that language mixing was not “haphazard” or a reflection of language confusion but was rule governed and systematic, like other ways of speaking (Riegelhaupt, 2000). Among the earliest to observe that language alternation revealed systematic, rule-governed behavior were Gumperz (1967, 1970), Gumperz and Hernández-Chávez (1970), Hasselmo (1972), Timm (1975), Wentz (1977), Wentz and McClure (1977), and Poplack (1978). By now, an extensive body of research has shown conclusively through rigorous empirical and theoretical analysis that bilinguals are exquisitely sensitive to tacit rules
that govern codeswitching itself, leading to the conclusion that language alternation is sophisticated, rule-governed behavior that in no way reflects a linguistic deficit (for summaries, see MacSwan, 2013, 2014, 2016a; Ritchie & Bhatia, 2013).

As Lipski (2014) recalled,

> Seeking to dispel popular notions that equate code-switching with confusion, “alingualism,” imperfect acquisition, and just plain laziness, linguists have since the early 1970s devoted considerable effort to demonstrating grammatical and pragmatic conditions favoring or constraining code-switching. Bilingual code-switching so analyzed is not regarded... as a deficiency or anomaly. (p. 24)

Rampton (2007) similarly remarked, “research on code-switching has waged a war on deficit models of bilingualism and on pejorative views of syncretic language use by insisting on the integrity of language mixing and by examining it for its grammatical systematicity and pragmatic coherence” (p. 306).

Codeswitching research usefully informs bilingual education theory and practice, especially with regard to views about the linguistic resources that bilingual children bring with them to school (Faltis, 1989; Jacobson, 1978; Paulston, 1983; Ramirez & Milk, 1986; Valdés-Fallis, 1978; Zentella, 1981, 1997). The way teachers, researchers, and others view children’s language ability is important because it affects their views of what children know and of their families and communities, and influences the treatment children are likely to receive in school. Indeed, the beliefs teachers hold about parents and communities may become tacit tracking mechanisms, serving to restrict the educational opportunities of bilingual students. Oakes’s (1985) classic work on tracking noted that ability grouping for children correlated highly with children’s self-perceptions of ability and career promise. More specifically with regard to bilingual children, if teachers believe that codeswitching relates to an inherent disability in children that might be remedied by instruction, then children’s perceptions of the funds of knowledge (Moll, Soto-Santiago, & Schwartz, 2013) they bring to school, as conveyed by classroom teachers, will likely have a negative impact on their success in school. Conversely, if teachers recognize that codeswitching is richly structured and evidence of linguistic talent, as research has shown, then children’s bilingual ability is more likely to be viewed as a resource rather than a deficit in educational settings.

Translanguaging was originally used by Williams (1994) to refer to “the planned and systematic use of two languages inside the same lesson” at school (Baker, 2011, p. 288), as also noted by García (2009) and Lewis, Jones, and Baker (2012). Similar proposed terms, each used a bit differently, include heteroglossia (Bakhtin, 1975), polylanguage and polylingual language (Jørgensen, 2008; Jørgensen, Karrebaek, Madsen, & Møller, 2011), metrolinguism (Otsuji & Pennycook, 2011), codemeshing (Canagarajah,
2011), translingual practice (Canagarajah, 2013), and multilanguaging (Nguyen, 2012). In recent studies of language alternation in classrooms, researchers have examined the way students use their two languages in combination to support bilingual acquisition in small group activities (Martin-Beltrán, 2014), teachers’ dynamic and interactive use of two languages in classroom instructional settings (Palmer, Martínez, Henderson, & Mateus, 2014), and the effects of using two languages concurrently in the teaching of reading (Soltero-González & Butvilofsky, 2015; Soltero-González, Sparrow, Butvilofsky, Escamilla, & Hopewell, 2016), among many others. In education-focused research, a variety of nomenclature have been used to describe language alternation, including translanguaging (Durán & Palmer, 2013; García, 2009; Gort, 2015; Gort & Sembianate, 2015; Henderson & Palmer, 2015; Hornberger & Link, 2012; Martin-Beltrán, 2014; Martínez, Hikida, & Durán, 2015; Martínez-Roldán, 2015; Palmer et al., 2014; Sayer, 2013; Smith & Murillo, 2015), hybrid language practices (Gutiérrez, Baquedano-López, & Tejeda, 1999; Gutiérrez, Bien, Selland, & Pierce, 2011; Palmer & Martínez, 2013), holistic bilingualism (Soltero-González, Escamilla, & Hopewell, 2011; Soltero-González, 2009; Soltero-González & Butvilofsky, 2015; Soltero-González et al., 2016), and codeswitching (Cook, 2001; Fuller, 2009, 2010; Gort, 2012; Martínez, 2010; Moschkovich, 2007; Nava, 2009; Palmer, 2009; Reyes, 2004; Shin, 2005), following the foundational work of Jacobson (1978, 1981, 1990), Milk (1986, 1990), and Faltis (1989, 1990, 1996). Some have used a variety of terms within the same publication to capture nuanced differences or used different terms in different publications depending on their research purpose. While these terminological contrasts reflect subtle differences, they also share many common attributes.

As a conceptual framework, translanguaging and related ideas promote a positive view of bilingualism, permitting bilinguals to act naturally, using language as they do at home and in their communities. Indeed, Cenoz and Gorter (2011) situate translanguaging and related proposals as instances of holistic bilingualism, that is, Grosjean’s (1982) important observation that a bilingual is not two monolinguals in one but a linguistically unique language user whose languages reflect the differential experience a bilingual may have with each language. Grosjean (1982, 2010) contrasts the holistic view with the fractional or monolingual view of bilingualism, which looks to native speakers of each language as “monolingual norms” against which the bilingual’s two languages are each compared. Grosjean used a sports analogy to illustrate the holistic perspective: Hurdlers blend two separate athletic competencies, high jumping and sprinting, as an integrated whole. Compared individually to high jumpers or sprinters, hurdlers meet neither set of expectations, but by blending both, hurdlers compete athletically in their own right, excelling in their sport in ways that neither high jumpers nor sprinters could. Grosjean’s perspective draws extensively on linguistic
and sociolinguistic research on bilingual codeswitching as an illustration of the special ways in which bilinguals exhibit their linguistic talents.

The article is organized in three parts. First, I discuss the idea of discrete languages, arguing that Chomsky’s (1980, 1986) useful distinction between E-language (language in the external sense) and I-language (language in the internal sense) allows us to accept linguistic diversity while rejecting language as an instrument of hegemony, and to recognize speech communities as useful idealizations. This leads to a discussion in the second part of the question of whether bilingual individuals have internally differentiated linguistic systems. I show that the study of language alternation and mixing compels us to acknowledge that they do have internally differentiated systems, but in a specific sense not considered by García and colleagues: Multilingual grammars include both shared and internally differentiated, language-particular components. In this context, I distinguish three views of multilingualism—a unitary model, a dual competence model, and an integrated multilingual model—arguing that evidence supports the integrated perspective, which I situate in the context of universal multilingualism, the view that everybody, even so-called monolinguals, are in fact multilinguals in important respects. In a final section, I distinguish mental grammars from linguistic repertoires, agreeing with García and colleagues that bilinguals, like monolinguals, have “one linguistic repertoire from which they select features strategically to communicate effectively” (García, 2012, p. 1) but not an internally undifferentiated unitary grammar. This allows us to recognize the oneness of a bilingual’s language use without the many undesirable consequences of denying the existence of community or individual multilingualism. I end with a brief conclusions section advocating a multilingual perspective on translanguaging, one that affirms the value and multiplicity of linguistic diversity for children, families, and communities.

Language(s)

People generally associate languages with nations and states: Japanese with Japan, French with France, and Urdu with Pakistan. Language is often used to consolidate political power and marginalize minorities who speak a language or language variety that differs from the one those in power use. States sanction as legitimate not a specific language but one or more language varieties—privileging some ways of talking and stigmatizing others. Such concerns motivated Makoni and Pennycook (2007) to describe languages as social and political “inventions,” not as discoveries. Linguistic stigma, whether it is associated with a marginalized language or language variety, is reinforced through traditional prescriptivism, the view that one language or language variety has an inherently higher value than others and that it ought to be imposed on an entire nation-state to maintain standards of communication (Crystal, 1986; MacSwan, 2000b; Pinker, 1994).
Prescriptivists have often characterized minority languages (or dialects) as “inexpressive,” “primitive,” or lacking complexity in comparison to their own language, for example, as with the language academies committed to the task of “purifying” the regional linguistic descendants of Latin established as early as 1582 in Italy, 1635 in France, and 1713 in Spain.

Traditional U.S. school curricula generally include familiar prohibitions against using double negatives, ain’t, or among the very strict, ending a sentence with a preposition, and many more. These prohibitions turn on Latinate analyses advanced in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and are used to validate varieties of speech associated with the privileged classes in England and the United States (Baugh & Cable, 1978). In contrast to this prescriptivist tradition, structuralist linguists undertook an empirical project, following Bloomfield’s (1928, 1933) lead, in which all languages were analyzed descriptively, using the same taxonomy, leading to the conclusion that all languages, even those that many people had thought of as “primitive languages,” were equally complex. This research agenda ultimately had serious consequences that threatened sacred distinctions that kept linguistic and social prestige in the hands of the privileged classes. As Newmeyer (1986) put it,

As long as American structuralists confined their campaign to the languages of remote tribes, they did little to upset their colleagues in departments of modern and classical languages—in which almost all linguists were situated in the interwar years. But such was certainly not the case when they began crusading for the linguistic equality of all dialects of English and other literary languages, no matter how “substandard” they were regarded. This egalitarian view came in direct conflict with the long-seated tradition in the humanities that values a language variety in direct proportion to its literary output. (p. 42)

While 17th-century Europe was preoccupied with the “special languages” of elites, the Port Royale Grammar of 1660 advanced a very different view of language and of the human condition. Written in French, the Port Royale Grammar formed part of the movement to displace Latin as an outdated mode of academic discourse. However, what marked the Port Royale Grammar as deeply distinct from contemporaneous approaches was its devotion to philosophical and universal properties of human language in descriptive terms (Chomsky, 1968; Newmeyer, 1988; Robins, 1967). As in modern approaches in the linguistic sciences, the Port Royale grammarians worked on the assumption that normal human intelligence is capable of acquiring knowledge through its own internal resources, making use of the data of experience but moving on to construct a cognitive system in terms of concepts and principles that are developed independently.

Hence, language has both a sociopolitical dimension and an individual cognitive dimension. Chomsky (1980, 1986) referred to language in the sociopolitical sense as E-language, where E denotes externalized and
extensional. Language in this sense is not the product of an individual per se but of a community of speakers, and it is extensional in the formal sense: Its expressions can only be listed, not defined by a generative system of rules; it is a collection of overlapping individual languages, or I-languages, where I denotes internalized, individual, and intensional (formally, given by a recursive rule system).

Linguistic theories about language structure and acquisition are focused on I-language, not E-language. “What we call ‘English,’ ‘French,’ ‘Spanish,’ and so on, even under idealizations to idiolects in homogeneous speech communities,” Chomsky (1995) noted, “reflect the Norman Conquest, proximity to Germanic areas, a Basque substratum, and other factors that cannot seriously be regarded as properties of the language faculty” (p. 11). Chomsky’s use of the term idiolect derives from Bloch (1948), who used it to denote “the totality of the possible utterances of one speaker at one time” (p. 7), differing from a dialect, or community language, which Bloch defined as “a class of idiolects” (p. 8). Bloch’s distinction was used by early sociolinguists (Hymes & Fought, 1975; Labov, 1972) to conceptualize the linguistic study of language variation and remains an important concept in linguistics and sociolinguistics today. An I-language is similar to an idiolect in that it denotes an individual’s language, and an E-language is similar to a national or community language in that it denotes an externalized collection of I-languages.

Just as Makoni and Pennycook (2007) recently contended that languages are social and historical “inventions,” Chomsky (1980) similarly regarded languages in the E-language sense as fictional. The realization that speech communities are idealizations, in this respect, is also evident in the work of early structuralist linguists like Leonard Bloomfield (1928), who defined a language as “the totality of utterances that can be made in a speech community” (p. 26). For Bloomfield and those who followed, it was understood, as Chomsky (1986) further noted, that speech communities, or “collections of individuals with the same speech behavior,” actually “do not exist in the real world.” Rather,

Each individual has acquired a language in the course of complex social interactions with people who vary in the ways in which they speak and interpret what they hear and in the internal representations that underlie their use of language. (p. 16)

While I-languages reflect the individual internalized grammatical system each of us has and are likely to each vary one from to the other in some respect, it is important to recognize that I-languages do not vary at random. Our divergent experiences result in individual linguistic differences, but the mechanisms and circumstances of language acquisition are such that we expect learners exposed to similar linguistic input to converge on similar I-languages. For instance, a learner exposed to a community of “English
speakers” will come to place subjects before verbs (e.g., *Sam ate lunch*), but a learner exposed to a community of “Irish speakers” will place them after verbs (e.g., *Cheannaigh Máire carr* [bought Máire car, Máire bought a car]; Stenson, 2007). A child raised in South Carolina might use double modal constructions like *I thought you might could help me* (Mishoe & Montgomery, 1994), and a language learner in London might acquire a phonological rule that changes *t* to the *d*-like sound (flapped *t*) in *water* ([wɔːrə]) and *writer* ([ˈraɪə]) because somewhere in her diverse language experience she spent significant time with somebody who learned English in the United States, Canada, Australia, or New Zealand. Thus, while I-languages each vary one from the other, language learning experience generally confines variation to narrow limits. We each speak individual languages, but our individual languages are remarkably similar to the individual languages used by members of our linguistic community (or communities).

Despite the recognition that language is individually represented, linguists refer to languages and even classes of languages by name in order to capture generalizations that hold across languages. Scientists in other fields use idealizations in a similar way. As Weisberg (2007) noted, idealization plays an important epistemic role across a wide range of disciplines (e.g., biology, physics, economics, mathematics), defined in the philosophy of science as “the intentional introduction of distortion into scientific theories” (p. 639). “Frictionless planes, point masses, infinite velocities, isolated systems, omniscient agents, and markets in perfect equilibrium are but some well-known examples” of scientific idealization (Frigg & Hartmann, 2012; see also Cartwright, 1989; Nowak, 1972, 1992). In linguistics, researchers interested in the range of structural variation associated with *wh*-constructions (questions that use words like *who*, *what*, and *why*, among others) might refer to “Chinese” or “English” to capture structural generalizations about these languages despite the presence of other language-internal variation, noting that English moves *wh*-question words to the front of an utterance (e.g., *What does Steve like?*, where *what*, as the object of *like*, has been moved from its position after the verb to the front of the sentence), while Chinese leaves these words in place (e.g., *Zhangsan xihuan shenme?*, with word order *Zhangsan like what* to mean “What does Zhangsan like?”). Or researchers may even find it useful to refer to broad classes of languages with similar typologies, using terms like *wb*-movement languages (e.g., English, French, Hungarian) and *wb*-in situ languages (e.g., Chinese, Korean, Swahili), or even English-type languages and Chinese-type languages. Sociolinguists interested in studying language use among African Americans might refer to African American Vernacular English (AAVE), another idealization across individual-level variation, seeking to understand any number of language-related behaviors specific to one or another community of speakers.
Idealizations like these treat members of a speech community as though they are homogeneous, purposely ignoring irrelevant variation as a tool of focused inquiry. Linguists interested in studying language diversity refer to E-languages (named languages or other speech communities) or even collections of E-languages (linguistic typology) by name as a convenience; this permits them to idealize across cases of individual variation to focus on relevant aspects of language that appear to be common to a community of speakers. These methods are used by linguists interested in language structure as well as those specializing in sociolinguistics, who study both structural characteristics of discrete speech communities and the social practices surrounding their language use.

Unpacking the ambiguity in the term *language* in this way helps us recognize the inherent sociopolitical nature of named languages, or E-languages, while still recognizing the linguistic reality of language diversity in the form of I-languages, or individual languages. Indeed, the linguistic study of language diversity is an important tool in our efforts to expose the political uses of language to justify meritocracy. For example, in studying AAVE, linguists have shown that AAVE consonant cluster reduction occurs when a consonant pair in word-final position shares the same place of articulation within the vocal tract and the same voicing (vibration of the vocal folds). Thus, *test* is pronounced like *Tess*, and *passed* like *pass* in AAVE. This pronunciation is sociopolitically stigmatized, but from a linguistic point of view, it is understood as a simple case of language variation, not different in principle from, say, the deletion of *r* in postvocalic position in words like *hard* and *butter* (pronounced [ʰa:d] and [bʌtə]) in some parts of the eastern United States (Labov, Ash, & Boberg, 2006). Thus, by acknowledging and studying language diversity, we can uncover the sociopolitical nature of language prejudice.

For linguists interested in the theory of grammar—or the nature of *mental grammars*, the focus of García and Otheguy (2014) and Otheguy et al. (2015)—individual grammars form the object of study, and speech communities are idealizations. For linguists who study the social variables of language variation, however, speech communities, while still idealizations, are themselves the objects of study, guided by questions about how language structure and use vary by geography, social class, age, sex, sexual orientation, and other factors (see Chambers & Schilling, 2013). Groups use language differently within varied and overlapping speech communities (Gumperz, 1964; Labov, 1972) to engage in different language practices (e.g., Eckert, 2000) or discourses (e.g., Gee, 2016b; Resnik, Asterhan, & Clarke, 2015). In large part, our linguistic uniqueness (I-language) is defined by our participation in multiple overlapping speech communities, resulting from the effects that each of these has had on the individual cognitive representation of language. Makoni and Pennycook’s (2007) central concern is that “named languages,” which are typically identified with nation-states,
form part of the colonial agenda and should be understood as social and political constructs, a widely held view in mainstream linguistics (e.g., Bloch, 1948; Chomsky, 1965, 1986, 1995; Gee, 2016a; Labov, 1972; Lyons, 1981; MacSwan, 2000a). However, if we dispense with any conception of speakers as members of idealized speech communities, then sociolinguistic research becomes wholly incongruous.

Indeed, some of the earliest work on codeswitching concerned switching between community and sanctioned languages, such as Ranamal, used in a Norwegian fishing village, and Bokmål, a legally sanctioned variety of Norwegian (Blom & Gumperz, 1972; Gumperz, 1964). Ranamal and Bokmål represent discrete communities insofar as speakers within each group understand one another by virtue of the great structural similarity across individual linguistic knowledge. Some individuals participate in both communities, some in just one or the other. Researchers have also studied codeswitching between AAVE and “standard” English, a politically sanctioned variety (DeBose, 1992).

Makoni and Pennycook’s (2007) novel contribution is not the observation that named languages are sociopolitical and arbitrary with respect to their boundaries but is rather their contention that this observation invalidates linguistic phenomena predicated on the existence of discrete speech communities—“such as language rights, mother tongues, multilingualism or code-switching” (p. 22). However, the existence of these phenomena depends not on whether named languages are political constructs but on whether we may reasonably speak of discrete speech communities by any name or for any purpose. Language names are used for potentially distinct but frequently overlapping political, social, or structural purposes. Sometimes the political distinctions are farcical from a structural point of view (e.g., Romanian vs. Moldovan), or social registers (e.g., academic English, gamer English) may lack clear political identification or significant structural distinctions. And sometimes structural generalizations pertain to broad (e.g., wh-in situ languages) or narrow (e.g., AAVE consonant cluster reduction) distinctions that cannot be neatly sorted politically or socially. The political use of language names can and should be distinguished from the social and structural idealizations used to study linguistic diversity. Whether we can reasonably speak of discrete languages or speech communities depends on the analytic utility of these constructs, not their political associations.

For García and colleagues (García & Otheguy, 2014; Otheguy et al., 2015), the implications of the sociopolitical nature of named languages relate specifically to individuals rather than groups. They distinguish their view from Makoni and Pennycook (2007) in this regard; rather than “simply abandoning the distinction or scuttling the concepts of language and bilingualism,” Otheguy et al. (2015) see discrete languages as restricted to the political sphere; as such, named languages
have nothing to do with individuals when seen from their own internal linguistic perspective, categories that have nothing to do, that is, with the billions of the world’s idiolects, which exist in a separate, linguistically unnamed and socially undifferentiated mental realm. (p. 293)

Here the question becomes not whether we may reasonably speak of discrete speech communities, but whether we may speak of an individual as having discretely represented linguistic systems that correspond to different speech communities (say, “Spanish” and “English”), that is, whether such a bilingual person has a single underlying grammar (in precisely the same way a “monolingual” does) or two discrete grammars, each corresponding to a different community. Of course, this is a question about I-language, and it is informed by a consideration of the nature of individual multilingualism. Fundamentally, the relevant question is whether bilingualism is psychologically real, that is, actually represented in the mind/brain of bilingual individuals. I turn to this question next.

**Individual Multilingualism**

Individual multilingualism concerns the nature of language in a multilingual or bilingual individual; it asks about the makeup of I-language, or what García and colleagues prefer to call *idiolect*, for such a person.

García and Otheguy (2014) present an approach to bilingualism that is “skeptical of the discreteness of named languages” and views “linguistic resources as disaggregated in the sense that features are separable and not integrated into linguistic systems” (p. 645). More specifically, they believe that bilingual mental grammars “consist of large and complex arrays of disaggregated structural features (phonetic, phonological, morphological, and semantic) that do not belong to or reside inside of the speaker’s two or more languages by virtue of inherently differentiated linguistic membership” (p. 644). Thus, codeswitching and related areas of research in bilingualism “labor under serious limitations”—stemming specifically from “the uncritical adoption of the external perspective that trades on the sociocultural separateness of languages and on the monoglossic ideology that privileges the monolingual speaker and the monolingual setting as the natural and unmarked condition of languaging” (p. 649).

Otheguy et al. (2015) observe, like others, that language in the sociopolitical sense is “a social construct, not a mental or psychological one” (p. 283). Because each individual’s language, and hence grammar, is unique, García and colleagues see each as an idiolect, conceptualized as unitary and lacking of any internal structural differentiation that might correspond to named languages like Mohawk, Farsi, Spanish, or English. By contrast, according to García and colleagues, codeswitching researchers see bilingualism as “dual competence,” a view they say codeswitching scholars take for granted rather
than derive empirically: “The duality is assumed a priori, and it is established in a manner that mirrors directly the bifurcation of the socially named language categories” (p. 298). Unfortunately, in both García and Otheguy (2014) and Otheguy et al. (2015), these characterizations of codeswitching research are merely asserted and not tied to an actual analysis of theoretical proposals in the literature, nor are any actual relevant citations provided.

The distinction in García and colleagues between named languages and idiolects has a long history in sociolinguistics and is uncontroversial, as noted, and likewise generally reflects the E-language/I-language distinction accepted in theoretical linguistics. The controversial thesis in the work of García and colleagues, with consequences for how we think about codeswitching, multilingualism, and related concepts, is the idea that individual bilinguals, like monolinguals, have unitary systems that lack any internal differentiation corresponding to the structural descriptions of named languages.

We may isolate three distinct perspectives on the nature of individual multilingualism, illustrated in Figure 1. The unitary model, advocated by García and colleagues (García & Otheguy, 2014; Otheguy et al., 2015), insists that bilinguals are the same as monolinguals in that in both instances, structural knowledge associated with what appear sociopolitically as two discrete languages actually reflects a single, internally undifferentiated system. García and colleagues attribute the dual competence model to codeswitching scholars, which they understand as the view that bilinguals have “two separate languages,” which are “switched” or “manipulated” according to their context of use (p. 298). A third perspective, which I will call the integrated multilingual model, posits that bilinguals have a single system with many shared grammatical resources but with some internal language-specific differentiation as well; I will show that this perspective is the view that has emerged from codeswitching research, not the dual competence model, as García and colleagues assert. Extending the integrated view further, I will argue that multilingualism, not monolingualism, is universal, and that each of us, even so called monolinguals, has multiple overlapping rule systems acquired through our participation in divergent speech communities.

Cummins (1981) correctly observed that the dual competence model, which is akin to the separate underlying proficiency (SUP) model he discussed, is a folk theory of multilingualism that “is not seriously proposed by any researcher” (p. 23). The idea suggests that the two linguistic systems have no point of contact, which would make routine translation impossible (see MacSwan & Rolstad, 2005, for discussion). Since García and colleagues also reject the dual competence model, we are only concerned with the question of whether an individual bilingual grammar might reflect organized internal differentiation of some kind (favoring the integrated multilingual model) or not (favoring the unitary model).

It is not plausible that the grammars of bilinguals lack internal language-particular differentiation, as one expects within the unitary model, because
such a system could not represent the contradictory requirements that bilin-
guals effortlessly manage and sustain. To illustrate this point, consider a child
who grows up hearing Farsi, an object-verb (OV) language, and English, a verb-object (VO) language. The child comes to know that in Farsi, objects
come before verbs, as in *Ye morqabi did-ænd* (one duck saw I, “I saw
a duck,” Mahootian, 1997), while in English, objects come after verbs (*I
saw a duck*). This bilingual expertly navigates the integration of these sys-
tems in separate contexts despite the contradictory evidence observed
regarding the basic word order of verbs and objects. Moreover, as
Mahootian (1993) shows for codeswitching contexts, a Farsi-English bilin-
gual will use Farsi word order with a Farsi verb, even if the object is
English (*Ten dollars dad-e*, ten dollars give-PERF, “She gave ten dollars”),
and English word order with an English verb, even if the object is Farsi
(*Tell them you’ll buy xune-ye jaedid when you sell your own house*, Tell
them you’ll buy house-POSS new when you sell your own house, “Tell
them you’ll buy a new house when you sell your own house”). How does
the linguistic system of a Farsi-English bilingual reliably generate OV word
order for Farsi, VO word order for English, OV word order for English-
Farsi codeswitching when the verb is Farsi, and VO word order for
English-Farsi codeswitching when the verb is English? Any appropriately

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**Figure 1. Three views of multilingualism.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Model</th>
<th>Diagram</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Dual Competence Model of Multilingualism</td>
<td><img src="image1" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><em>Multilinguals have fully discrete, non-overlapping linguistic systems</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Unitary Model of Multilingualism</td>
<td><img src="image2" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><em>Multilinguals have a single system</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Integrated Multilingual Model</td>
<td><img src="image3" alt="Diagram" /></td>
<td><em>Multilinguals have both shared and discrete grammatical resources; multilingualism is universal</em></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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detailed answer to this question will entail that the Farsi-English bilingual grammar has some level of internal differentiation, implying that bilingualism is psychologically real—that is, an actual part of our linguistic knowledge.

In addition to word order facts such as these, codeswitching research also reveals interesting grammaticality effects. Grammaticality effects serve in large part as the basis for linguists’ theories about the structure of our tacit knowledge of language. For example, English speakers regard *John saw the red barn* and *John painted the barn red* as well formed (or grammatical) but regard *John saw the barn red* as ill formed (or ungrammatical). *John put the book back on the coffee table* is well formed, but *Table coffee the on back book the put John* is not. Data such as these allow linguists to posit theories about grammatical structure; such theories (or grammars) must define all the well-formed expressions of a language to the exclusion of all the ill-formed expressions, both of which are infinite sets.

With this in mind, consider another illustration, this one from Spanish-English codeswitching. A Spanish determiner like *los* may precede an English noun like *teachers*, giving us *los teachers* (“the teachers”), but if we reverse the direction of the codeswitch, a different pattern emerges: An English determiner before a Spanish noun is ill formed, so that examples like *the casa* (“the house”) are unattested in corpora and judged to be ill formed by Spanish-English bilinguals (Jake, Myers-Scotton, & Gross, 2003; Liceras, Spradlin, & Fernández Fuertes, 2005; Lipski, 1978; Moro, 2014; Moyer, 1993). This is a surprising fact and presents intriguing challenges for a theory of bilingual grammar. What property of determiners or nouns results in these different patterns of intuitions for Spanish-English bilinguals? A sufficiently precise theory will need to posit an underlying system that attributes different properties to “Spanish” and “English” to explain such data, again implying language-specific internal differentiation.

Consider a final illustration. A Spanish-English bilingual knows two contradictory things about adjective/noun word order in the abstract: Adjectives follow nouns (e.g., *casa blanca*), and nouns follow adjectives (e.g., *white house*). She consistently applies the Spanish rule to Spanish words and the English rule to English words, never uttering expressions like *house white* or *blanca casa* (unless engaged in poetic license or marked language play). Furthermore, she will codeswitch in a structured way, strongly preferring *the white casa* over *the casa white* (Belazi, Rubin, & Toribio, 1994; Gumperz, 1967; Lipski, 1978; Poplack, 1981; Sankoff & Poplack, 1981). So the underlying linguistic system of a Spanish-English bilingual will generate *the white house, la casa blanca, and the white casa*, but not *the house white, la blanca casa, or the casa white*. What is the nature of the internal rule system such that these patterns emerge? Again, any sufficiently detailed response will entail that the bilingual grammar makes use of structured and internally organized differentiation of some kind.
Otheguy et al. (2015) believe that “from the inception of research in code switching,” researchers have begged the question of language differentiation, embedding the truth of their conclusions within the basic premises of their research:

It is an assumption, and this is the point, that makes the conclusion of internal duality of competence to a large extent pre-ordained by the dual tagging of the data, a tagging performed on the basis of the external named language categories. (p. 298)

In actuality, codeswitching researchers have guarded carefully against this fallacy, the potential for which is real, and have taken care to conceptualize language differences according to the structural patterns evidenced by speakers, not according to the political identifications of languages. At an individual cognitive level, whether a system is internally differentiated or not relates to the nature of the linguistic rule system and whether the hypothesized system of grammar could capture the observed facts without internal differentiation.

One sees this care even “from the inception” of codeswitching research, evident in Sankoff and Poplack (1981), who noted the existence of “some debate over whether discourse containing code-switches is generated by the alternate use of the two monolingual grammars or whether a single code-switching grammar exists, combining elements of the monolingual grammars” (p. 10). To address this question, codeswitching scholars use standard methods of linguistic analysis to draw conclusions about what specific properties bilingual grammars actually have in light of relevant data. As in other scientific enterprises, this approach takes the simplest solution to be preferred as it likely captures the broadest generalization, moving on to more complex solutions only as the facts require.

To evaluate the simplest assumption, that monolinguals have a single undifferentiated system, Sankoff and Poplack (1981) began by considering a grammar that consisted of the logical union of two phrase structure grammars, one for English and another for Spanish. A phrase structure grammar, which was a component of a generative-transformational grammar as developed in Chomsky (1957, 1965), is a system of rules that “recursively enumerates structural descriptions of sentences” (Chomsky, 1968, p. 165) to capture the creative aspect of language use. The rule system generates a tree structure, with internal branching capturing the relatedness among nodes in the tree. A phrase structure rule such as $S \rightarrow NP \ VP$, for instance, defines a structure in which $S$ (a sentence) immediately dominates two branches, $NP$ (noun phrase) and $VP$ (verb phrase). Another rule, $NP \rightarrow Det \ N \ Adj$, further expands $NP$ within the structure with an additional layer, this time a determiner ($Det$), noun ($N$), and adjective ($Adj$) sequence. Lexical insertion rules (e.g., $Det \rightarrow la$, $N \rightarrow casa$, $Adj \rightarrow blanca$) apply in this simple system to fill in the terminal nodes of the tree, with a final result such as $la \ casa \ blanca$. An
English version of this simplified grammar differs in (at least) two key respects: The phrase structure rule for NP is $NP \rightarrow Det \ Adj \ N$, placing the adjective before the noun, and examples of lexical insertion rules include $Det \rightarrow the$, $Adj \rightarrow white$, and $N \rightarrow house$, with results such as the white house.

Sankoff and Poplack (1981) observed that an internally undifferentiated system (their “free union grammar”) would generate many ill-formed results, giving us not only ill-formed codeswitches like the casa white instead of the white casa, but it would even permit Spanish expressions with English word order and English expressions with Spanish word order, as illustrated in Figure 2. Sankoff and Poplack engaged in this exercise to illustrate that a free union grammar, or unitary system, could not succeed as it generates ill-formed sentences. Having shown that the simplest solution is inadequate, they restricted this system in a way that tied the lexical insertion rules to language-particular phrase structure rules to the extent required by the facts. They accomplished this by introducing a superscripting mechanism, known as a language tag. In effect, this convention introduced internal differentiation within the system as it associated Spanish lexical items with phrase structure rules specific to Spanish, and English lexical items with English rules, but allowed rules common to both to be lexically filled by either language. In Figure 2, using this system, the subject NP would be tagged as an English phrase structure rule, eligible for lexical insertion from English, and the object NP would be tagged as a Spanish phrase structure rule, eligible for lexical insertion from Spanish. Rules common to both English and Spanish are not so tagged and represent shared resources. Lipski (1978), Pfaff (1979), and Woolford (1983) similarly proposed that an equivalence condition governed the ways in which languages could be mixed.

As linguistics evolved in the 1980s and 1990s, driven by new discoveries, approaches to handling internal diversity of the linguistic system took advantage of new theories. The grammatical theories underlying Sankoff and Poplack’s work built structure top-down, first generating a tree structure, which represented word order, then inserting lexical items after the word order had been set. This limitation of the linguistic theory under which Sankoff and Poplack labored required them to tinker with the system, introducing a language tag as an ad hoc stipulation to tie structure-building rules to lexical insertion rules. Similarly, Di Sciuollo, Muysken, and Singh (1986) made use of a language index, and Belazi et al. (1994) used a language feature to derive their results. While these approaches shared limitations with Sankoff and Poplack (1981), they used a common methodological approach: Committed to theoretical parsimony, they assumed minimal internal differentiation within the bilingual grammar, aligning lexical items and syntactic rules only to the extent the facts compelled them to do so. The resulting system could be understood, as Sankoff and Poplack intended, as “a single grammar based on the two monolingual ones”—an integrated system.
Current theories of codeswitching take advantage of a different syntactic architecture that builds structure from the bottom up (Chomsky, 1995, 2007; Uriagereka, 2012). In this system, known as the minimalist program, trees such as the one exemplified in Figure 2 are not generated by phrase structure grammars but by an operation called Merge, which uses lexical information (encoded in each lexical item, or word) to combine elements into (binary branching) trees. Other functions operate on branching points such as V, VP, NP to create derivative structures.

A basic intuition underlying the minimalist program is that language-specific differences are encoded in the lexicon, with the rest of the underlying linguistic system held to be invariant across different languages. As Chomsky (1991) explained,

If there were only one human language, the story would essentially end there. But we know that this is false, a rather surprising fact. The general principles of the initial state evidently allow a range of variation. Associated with many principles there are parameters with a few—perhaps just two—values. Possibly, as proposed by Hagit Borer [1984], the parameters are actually restricted to the lexicon, which would mean that the rest of the I-language is fixed and invariant, a far-reaching idea that has proven quite productive. (p. 23)

The lexicon stores information other than just the phonetic shape and meaning of words in this framework. Each item within the lexicon also encodes morphological, syntactic, and phonological features of various kinds; these feature arrays and their possible values vary for different languages.
This core idea, that parameters of linguistic variation are “restricted to the lexicon” and “the rest of the I-language is fixed and invariant,” suggests an integrated view of bilingualism in which the fixed and invariant aspects of language are shared linguistic resources while those that include aspects of language variation are encoded in the lexicon. This idea is fleshed out in detail in MacSwan (1999, 2000a, 2005a, 2005b, 2014) and further developed in Bandi-Rao and den Dikken (2014); Cantone and MacSwan (2009); Cantone and Müller (2005, 2008); Di Sciullo (2014); Finer (2014); Giancaspro (2015); González-Vilbazo and López (2011, 2012); Grimstad, Lohndal, and Afarli (2014); Lillo-Martin, Müller, and Chen Pichler (2016); MacSwan and Colina (2014); Milian (2014); Moro (2014); Sánchez (2012); Toribio and González-Vilbazo (2014); Van Dulm (2007, 2009); and van Gelderen and MacSwan (2008), among others. Specifically, this codeswitching model uses discrete lexicons and morphophonological systems to represent language-particular features, with invariant syntactic and semantic features serving as shared resources. As such, it presents an integrated model of individual multilingualism. Thus, the field does not take language differentiation for granted, based on naïve assumptions that ignore the well-known history of linguistic colonization; rather, it posits the existence of an internally differentiated system based on an analysis of the bilingual data themselves and the nature of the representations that generate them.

For precisely these reasons, some have proposed that all linguistic systems, even those of so-called monolinguals, are internally richly diverse, leading many to view monolingualism, not multilingualism, as a social construction. For instance, Roeper (1999, 2003, 2011, 2016) has argued that the sort of system-internal differentiation typically associated with multilinguals is universal and that even monolinguals have an integrated system of internally differentiated subcomponents developed to manage the contradictory structural requirements of their grammars. I have incorporated Roeper’s idea in the representation of the integrated multilingual model in Figure 1. (Also see Adger, 2006, and references cited there.)

Roeper observed that English speakers (for instance) have stylistic variations, or social registers, that exhibit structural characteristics typical of many Germanic languages but not typical of English, such as *A single salad does not a dinner make* and *One captured fish does not a fisherman make*. Other stylistic alternatives include *Say you so?* and *It matters not what you do*. Here, as in many other Germanic languages, the main verb occurs in sentence-final position. However, this structure is not generalizable to all contexts, as Roeper illustrates with examples like *A tiny orange does not someone peel*, generally regarded as ill formed. Roeper’s multiple grammars theory, then, posits that all speakers have internally differentiated grammars, each containing multiple “mini-grammars,” which represent the underlying system of the several linguistic registers we know.
In codeswitching research, as in any robust field, specific theories and proposals develop over time, and researchers will disagree as to the best way to capture a phenomenon theoretically. However, regardless of one's preferred codeswitching framework, the data lead to a similar conclusion with regard to the organization of bilingual grammars. Farsi-English bilinguals consistently use VO word order with English verbs and OV word order with Farsi verbs in monolingual and bilingual contexts alike. Spanish-English bilinguals place adjectives after nouns when speaking Spanish, place nouns after adjectives when speaking English, and use English adjectives before Spanish nouns when codeswitching but not vice versa; they also will use English determiners before Spanish nouns but not vice versa. There seems to be no conception of grammar in the usual sense of the word in which such data could be explained in the absence of system-internal, language-particular differentiation of some kind.

In addition, it is worth noting that the unitary perspective is at odds not only with codeswitching research but also with scholarship on bilingual first language acquisition, where researchers have found that children's syntactic and phonological development in two languages proceeds essentially independently of one another, respecting the developmental timetable specific to each language as documented in monolingual acquisition research (Genesee & Nicoladis, 2006; Lindholm & Padilla, 1978; Müller & Cantone, 2009). For example, Paradis and Genesee (1996) found that developing French-English simultaneous bilingual children used finite verb forms earlier in French than in English, used subject pronouns in French exclusively with finite verbs but subject pronouns in English with both finite and nonfinite verbs, and placed verbal negatives after lexical verbs in French (e.g., n'aime pas “do not like,” where pas is negation) but before lexical verbs in English (e.g., do not like). An alternative view, known as the unitary language system hypothesis, was advanced by Volterra and Taeschner (1978) but quickly fell into disfavor based on considerable empirical evidence. For further discussion, see Genesee (2001) and Silva-Corvalán (2014). The neurolinguistics literature has also confirmed the early differentiation perspective in bilingual first language acquisition (Kovelman, Baker, & Petitto, 2008).

In linguistics, explicit theories of phenomena are critically important (Chomsky, 1957; Gee, 2016b). An explicit linguistic theory is one that does not rely on tacit assumptions about how language works but rather overtly states all relevant details. In this way, we protect ourselves from allowing our unexamined assumptions to guide our perceptions or analysis of language, language differences, or bilingualism. The unitary view of bilingual competence of García and colleagues (García & Otheguy, 2014; Otheguy et al., 2015) offers a general perspective on a key postulate that might underlie an eventual explicit theory of bilingualism, but their ideas about mental architecture are not sufficiently detailed to permit empirical investigation. Specifically, we do not know how they imagine features to be both
organized and disaggregated or what these features actually are. We expect linguistic analyses that show us, for instance, that Spanish agreement features (called $\varphi$-features) specifying person, number, and gender can be preserved alongside English $\varphi$-features specifying just person and number, with consequences for feature theory that are consistent with the bilingual data (e.g., Moro, 2014). An explicit theory so developed would allow us to see how these features are organized in a unitary system such that these distinctions could be maintained, and consider in concrete terms whether the hypothesized system is unitary or integrated in nature. We would furthermore expect analyses that show us what specific property of Farsi and English is responsible for the OV/VO word order distinction and how that property is represented in a disaggregated system of features like the one suggested, such that it has the consequences for word order observed in the linguistic data (e.g., MacSwan, 2004), or what properties of adjective-noun word order might account for the grammaticality effects observed for Spanish-English and other language pairs (e.g., Cantone & MacSwan, 2009). In a unitary system, how do we explain these language differences such that we could still regard the grammar as a single, disaggregated system, and how does the new analysis differ from explicit proposals put forward in the codeswitching literature?

Because details of this nature are not provided, García and colleagues’ basic idea is not sufficiently clear to be directly evaluated. My strategy here has been to show that the unitary model is inconsistent with what we know empirically from the data of language alternation and theoretically from the codeswitching literature and that the facts are such that a theoretically rigorous solution promoting a unitary model is unlikely to succeed, just as generations of codeswitching researchers have found.

Based on an examination of the evidence, I-languages are clearly linguistically diverse, in the sense that a single I-language will exhibit sometimes contradictory patterns (e.g., OV and VO word order), supporting the integrated model of multilingualism illustrated in Figure 1. I have made the point, too, following Roeper (1999, 2016), that so-called monolinguals are also linguistically diverse, each possessing knowledge of different social languages and speech registers appropriate to different contexts of use. This evidence is sufficient to make the case that individual multilingualism is psychologically real, contrary to the view expressed by García and colleagues as the basis for their critique of codeswitching.

Linguistic Repertoires and Mental Grammars

Linguists who study language variation in social contexts often use the metaphor of a repertoire to refer to the broad stock of speech styles, registers, varieties, and languages people know (Coulmas, 2005; Spolsky, 1998). The term was classically introduced by John Gumperz, who defined
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a “verbal repertoire” as “the totality of linguistic forms regularly employed in the course of socially significant interaction” (1964, p. 137). One way to conceptualize a verbal or linguistic repertoire is as a collection of what Gee (2016a) calls social languages.

Languages the size of “English” or “Russian” are composed of a myriad of what I will call “social languages” (Gee, 2014). Social languages (some of which might be called dialects, registers, varieties, or styles or by other names) are styles of using words, grammar, and discourse to enact a socially significant identity. (p. 69)

These social languages are enacted in different contexts to create one or more social identities in interaction with others. Everybody has a diverse linguistic repertoire consisting of multiple social languages. These social languages are each appropriate to one or more social contexts but may feel out of place in some settings. Gee (2016a) gives an example:

Imagine I park my motorcycle, enter my neighborhood “biker bar,” and say to my leather-jacketed and tattooed drinking buddy, as I sit down: “May I have a match for my cigarette, please?” What I have said is perfectly grammatical English, but it is “wrong” nonetheless, unless I have used a heavily ironic tone of voice. It is not just the content of what you say that is important, but how you say it. And in this bar, I haven’t said it in the “right” way. I should have said something like “Gotta match?” or “Give me a light, wouldya?” (p. 3)

The formal register inappropriately used in this context would be contextually appropriate in other settings, such as school. School language, on this view, is just one (set) of many social languages used to create a particular persona in specific contexts and for specific tasks (Gee, 2016b).

We are all multilinguals in the sense that we each use different ways of talking in different social contexts. But for some, these social languages are enacted through more dramatic structural differences, broadly described with labels like English and Spanish. A bilingual in this sense selects different social languages according to social and situational contexts, like any of us—sometimes making use of both languages simultaneously (codeswitching) and sometimes making use of just one. A bilingual may exclusively use a heritage language with a monolingual grandparent, use English with an interlocutor whom she believes not to speak her community language, and switch between her languages with siblings, parents, and other members of her community. Or matters may be much more complex, involving the active use of multiple varieties of both, used to navigate families, local communities, and schools (Sayer, 2013).

Importantly, for present purposes, a repertoire is not a grammar but a catalog of the ways we each can talk in different social contexts. It includes
our richly diverse internalized mental grammars as well as the diverse vocabulary and systems of knowledge pertaining to discourse, pragmatics, and other social conventions that we recruit in verbal interactions with others. In Gumperz’s (1964) terms, it reflects “contextual and social differences in speech... subject both to grammatical and social restraints” (pp. 137–138). Mental grammars are thus but a small part of our overall knowledge of how to use language in social contexts, defining the narrow structural mapping from sound to meaning.

For monolinguals and bilinguals alike, a grammar is a set of interrelated components that are defined by the nature of the representations they generate and transform. Even in the context of typical theories of monolingual language, theories of structure posit that speakers have discrete subsystems corresponding to syntax and phonology as well as other dimensions of linguistic knowledge. Phonology uses processes very different from syntax; it modifies word structures and introduces prosodic features, proceeding in a linear derivation, whereas syntax is hierarchically represented, as illustrated in Figure 2, and modifies word order (Bermúdez-Otero & Honeybone, 2006; Bromberger & Halle, 1989; Chomsky, 1995). Grammatical features responsible for cross-linguistic differences, such as OV/VO word order and noun/adjective word order, are discretely represented for bilinguals in a way that permits them to manage contradictory requirements of the two languages they know. Human beings effortlessly navigate these and other discrete subsystems of linguistic knowledge without a hint of distraction, just as they effortlessly process visual images, recognize familiar faces, and engage in other ordinary cognitive tasks. We are not compelled to refer to these subsystems as undifferentiated and unitary and should likewise be unconcerned about theories of grammar that posit subsystems to manage language-particular (e.g., English, Spanish) structural differences.

Although García and colleagues focus their discussion on the nature of an individual bilingual’s mental grammar, the definition of translanguaging itself is usually offered in terms of linguistic repertoire. For instance, García (2012) argued that “bilinguals have one linguistic repertoire from which they select features strategically to communicate effectively” (p. 1), and in the more recently refined definition presented in Otheguy et al. (2015) translanguaging is “the deployment of a speaker’s full linguistic repertoire without regard for watchful adherence to the socially and politically defined boundaries of named (and usually national and state) languages” (p. 283).

There is broad agreement on this point of view, which is also consistent with program effectiveness research showing that inclusion of children’s home language in classroom settings is positively associated with conventional measures of school success (Reljić, Ferring, & Martin, 2015; Rolstad, Mahoney, & Glass, 2005). It is widely believed that inclusion of children’s home language in school not only makes instruction comprehensible but also affirms the language and cultural identities children bring from their
homes and communities (Moll et al., 2013; Paris, 2012; Ruiz, 1984). However, our shared view that multilingual children should have access to their “full linguistic repertoire without regard for watchful adherence to the socially and politically defined boundaries of named (and usually national and state) languages” in no way implies that our linguistic knowledge is not internally diverse. The multilingual perspective on translanguaging offered here is wholly consistent with this point of view and indeed may be seen as adding important support: We are not all individually monolingual but rather multilingual, with rich internal diversity; as with any person in any community, the richness of the linguistic diversity of multilingual students should be viewed as a critically important resource promoting their educational success.

Conclusions

Translanguaging invites children to use language in school as they do in their community, a crucial component of a culturally sustaining pedagogy (Paris, 2012) and one that permits children and families to develop forms of human capital (Smith & Murillo, 2015). Ideologically, translanguaging views bilingualism holistically, a perspective Grosjean (1982) has advocated. But for Grosjean and others, bilingualism is not just social and political; it is also psychologically real. A bilingual is a uniquely situated language user who functions bilingually, drawing on whatever language resources are appropriate, and is not the sum of two monolinguals. Translanguaging theory has made important and promising contributions to language ideology, policy, pedagogy, and the way educators think about language use in classroom settings. It extends the metaphor of holism to the linguistic repertoire of bilingual children, noting that schools should make use of the full range of diverse linguistic talents that bilinguals bring with them to the classroom.

However, it is mistaken and ultimately counterproductive to claim that the colonial history of language differentiation implies that talk of (idealized) named languages and other identifiable speech communities is incongruous and that individual bilingual grammars are internally unitary and undifferentiated. It erroneously ascribes to codeswitching researchers a dual competence perspective on bilingual mental grammar, attributing to them a “monoglossic ideology that privileges the monolingual speaker and the monolingual setting as the natural and unmarked condition of languaging” (García & Otheguy, 2014, p. 649). This attribution is not only factually incorrect, but taken seriously, it would undermine critical research support for a view of bilingualism as a linguistic talent rather than a worrisome deficit. Like research on AAVE, codeswitching research has shown through detailed analysis that bilinguals are exquisitely sensitive to an incredibly rich and intricate underlying system of rules for both languages in their repertoires.

A significant consequence of dispensing with conceptions of multilingualism is that doing so would put familiar and important topics of study
out of reach, along with the theoretical and conceptual utility they bring. It not only renders such topics as language rights, mother tongues, and codeswitching incongruous (Makoni & Pennycook, 2007) but also removes from discussion any notion of community-level variation, second language acquisition, and much of the field of sociolinguistics. For researchers concerned with multilingualism in schools, these are critically important areas of inquiry, and many of them (not just codeswitching) are commonly used as an empirical defense of a view of bilingualism as a rich resource reflective of linguistic talent, not confusion or “semilingualism.”

I have proposed an alternative view of the underlying theory of translanguaging, which I call a **multilingual perspective**. This perspective accepts individual multilingualism as not only psychologically real, in the integrated sense, but also universal. Here, codeswitching may be seen as an instance of translanguaging, alongside other bilingual phenomena such as translation, borrowing, and additional processes, in a range of modalities, as in earlier treatments (García, 2009, p. 45; García, 2011, p. 147). Translanguaging research has made important contributions to our conception of bilingual language policy and practice and has sparked new research on language distribution in multilingual classrooms. Most importantly, it problematizes conventional assumptions regarding language mixing in classroom settings, where new research has contributed to our understanding of the ways in which codeswitching may be instrumental in teaching and learning. As a pedagogical approach, translanguaging emphasizes the dynamic use of multiple languages to enhance learning and make schools more welcoming environments for multilingual children, families, and communities. It can and should affirm the value and multiplicity of linguistic diversity—across and within communities and individuals.

**Notes**

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1I use the term **multilingualism** to refer to knowledge of at least two languages and the term **bilingualism** to specifically denote a multilingual who knows just two languages. The alternation reflects slightly different contexts of use that will not be of issue in the present discussion. See Edwards (2013) for discussion.

2Codeswitching is variously spelled **code-switching**, **codeswitching**, and **code switching**. Quoted texts retain their original preferred spelling in this review.

3The approach in Bandi-Rao and den Dikken (2014); Grimstad, Lohndal, and Afarli (2014); and Lillo-Martin, Müller, and Chen Pichler (2016) explores a slightly different architecture based on research in distributed morphology in which vocabulary insertion is guided by a rich feature array postsyntactically. See MacSwan (2016b) for discussion.
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